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Abstract
Hoare’s logic is an axiomatic system of proving programs correct, which
has been extended to be a separation logic to reason about mutable heap
structure. We develop the most fundamental logical structure of strongest
postcondition of Hoare’s logic in Peano’s arithmetic PA. Let p ∈ L and S be
any while-program. The arithmetical definability of N-computable function
fNS leads to separate S from SP (p, S), which defines the strongest postcon-
dition of p and S over N, achieving an equivalent but more meaningful form
in PA. From the reduction of Hoare’s logic to PA, together with well-defined
underlying semantics, it follows that Hoare’s logic is sound and complete rel-
ative to the theory of PA, which is different from the relative completeness
in the sense of Cook. Finally, we discuss two ways to extend computability
from the standard structure to nonstandard models of PA.
Keywords: Hoare’s logic, Peano’s arithmetic, strongest postcondition,
N-computable function, definability, completeness
1. Introduction
Hoare’s logic is a formal system for the derivation of statements about
the partial correctness of programs [1]; it was introduced by Hoare [2] and
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studied by Cook[3], Lipton[4], Wand[5] and Clarke[6]. Separation logic is a
spatial logic for reasoning about mutable heap structure ([7, 8, 9]), which
is an extension to Hoare’s logic to describe the applications of programs on
the heap structure and the reasoning about memory update. It would be
interesting to reconsider Hoare’s logic and the computability induced by the
accessability relations on models of Hoare’s logic, since Hoare’s logic, taken
as a modal logic [10], defines its model M′ on the assignments of the model
M of the first-order languages based on which Hoare’s logic is defined, which
leads to the special form of the completeness theorem different from that of
the first-order logic.
Hoare’s logic for the set WP of all while-programs with first-order as-
sertion language L and first-order specification T we denote HL(T ). The
formulas in Hoare’s system are triples of the form {p}S{q}, where p, q ∈ L
and S ∈ WP . We also call the triple {p}S{q} a specified or asserted program.
The specified program {p}S{q} is true in a first-order model M, denoted by
M |= {p}S{q}, if and only if for any initial assignment of the program vari-
ables over M, if p holds and S is executed, then either S will fail to terminate
or q will be satisfied by the final assignment defined by the program modality
over M. Call the language L expressive relative to model M if for all p ∈ L
and S ∈ WP there exists q ∈ L which defines the strongest postcondition of
p and S relative to M. If L is expressive relative to M, then M |= {p}S{q}
implies HL(Th(M)) ⊢ {p}S{q}, where p, q ∈ L, S ∈ WP and by Th(M)
we mean the set of all true L-sentences in M. This is the so-called relative
completeness(i.e. relative to some model) in the sense of Cook.
In the following, let L be the language of arithmetic. Since L is expressive
relative to the standard structure N, then any true specified program can
be proved in HL(Th(N)). Bergstra and Tucker[11] studied verification on
an entirely proof-theoretic basis, where the facts about arithmetic must be
formally deduced from Peano’s arithmetic PA or its refinement, and not
popped from the oracle Th(N). The main theorem proved by them is listed
as follows.
Theorem 1.1 (Bergstra, et.al [1983]). Given an assertion p ∈ L and program
S ∈ WP one can effectively calculate an assertion SP (p, S) ∈ L such that
(1) SP (p, S) defines the strongest postcondition of S relative to p on the
set of states over N ;
(2) HL(PA) ⊢ {p}S{SP (p, S)}. And, for any refinement T of Peano
arithmetic, including PA itself,
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(3) HL(T ) ⊢ {p}S{q} if and only if T ⊢ SP (p, S)→ q.
The requirement of expressiveness restricts the interpretation of PA to
only the standard structure N up to isomorphism [4]. Therefore, relative to
N, Bergstra and Tucker proved that HL(PA) can be reduced to PA, which
is their original intent. Closer scrutiny of their argumentation reveals that
Theorem 1.1 also holds relative to the theory of PA(i.e. relative to all mod-
els of PA) under the assumption that they generalized the classical coding
function, which is used to code a finite sequence of natural numbers, to code
an M-finite sequence of numbers for any model M of PA(i.e. generalized
coding function), where byM-finite we mean the sequence has ’length’ corre-
sponding to elements in M. In the sequel, we develop our theoretical results
relative to the theory of PA under this assumption.
The semantical definition of strongest postcondition is well formalized in
Cook[3, p85]. Bergstra, et.al[11, p271] gives the formal definition of strongest
postcondition of p ∈ L and S ∈ WP relative to N, i.e. SP (p, S) men-
tioned above, and proves some of its important properties as a theorem in
PA. In this paper, we develop the most fundamental logical structure of
strongest postcondition of Hoare’s logic applied to arithmetic as it is defined
by Peano’s axioms, through which we can explain strongest postcondition
more intuitively at the syntactic level. In principle, the N-computability in-
duced by while-programs is equivalent to that of recursive functions, which
are arithmetically definable [12, p199], hence, we can arithmetically define
N-computable function fNS induced by while-program S concretely. The
arithmetical definability of fNS leads to separate S from SP (p, S), achiev-
ing an equivalent but more meaningful form in PA, which is illustrated as
follows.
Theorem 1.2 (Separation Theorem). For any n-place formula p(
⇀
x) ∈ L,
and n-place program S ∈ WP ,
PA ⊢ SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
,
where αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y )(resp. SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)) arithmetically defines fNS (resp. spN(p, S)),
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x), i.e. p(u1/x1, . . . , un/xn), stands for the result of substituting ui for
each free occurrence of xi in p for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y ) is
defined analogously.
The Separation Theorem captures the essence of the expressiveness condi-
tion. Replacing SP (p, S) by ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x)∧αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
in statement
3
(3) of Theorem 1.1, one can not just obtain a conceptual clarity, but also
simplify the strongest postcondition calculus inside considerably. Then it
follows the following corollary.
Corollary 1.3. For any n-place formulas p(
⇀
x), q(
⇀
x) ∈ L and n-place pro-
gram S ∈ WP ,
HL(PA) ⊢ {p}S{q} iff PA ⊢ p(
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y )→ q(
⇀
y /
⇀
x),
where αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) arithmetically defines fNS , q(
⇀
y /
⇀
x), i.e. q(y1/x1, . . . , yn/xn),
stands for the result of substituting yi for each free occurrence of xi in q for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The corollary reduces Hoare’s logic grounded on the theory of PA to
the first-order logic PA. If we can extend computability induced by S from
the standard structure to nonstandard models of PA with the same Σ1-
definability, that is M-computable function fMS is defined by αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) in
nonstandard model M of PA, then we can well define M |= {p}S{q} for any
model M |= PA, which we denote by HL(PA) |= {p}S{q}. With the well-
defined underlying semantics, it easily deduces that HL(PA) |= {p}S{q} iff
PA |= p(
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) → q(
⇀
y /
⇀
x). From Go¨del’s Soundness and Com-
pleteness Theorem, together with Corollary 1.3, it follows that HL(PA) |=
{p}S{q} iff HL(PA) ⊢ {p}S{q}. Consequently, Hoare’s logic is sound and
complete relative to the theory of PA, which is different from the relative
completeness. More remarks about how to build the underlying semantics
are left for the last section.
The paper is organized as follows: In Preliminaries, we give the formal de-
scription of Peano’s arithmetic and coding functions. In section 3, we define
Hoare’s logic based on PA, its syntax and semantics. In section 4, we first
give the definition of the N-computable function and argue its arithmetical
definability; Then, we inductively construct SP (p, S) like that in [11, p273];
Finally, with the generalized coding function, we prove the Separation The-
orem. In the last section, we discuss the extended computability and our
future work.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Peano’s arithmetic
By PA we denote the theory of Peano’s arithmetic, which is the set of
all sentences of the language of arithmetic that are provable from Peano’s
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axioms. Also, in this paper, we treat PA as the logical system of Peano’s
arithmetic. The desired data type semantics is the standard model N. The
domain of N is the set ω of natural numbers and its primitive operations are
the addition x+ y and multiplication x · y; < is the linear ordering relation
on N ; 0, 1 ∈ ω are two distinguished elements. We shall use these notations
for the function symbols, relation symbol and constant symbols in L. Let
L = {+, ·, <, 0, 1}. List the axioms of Peano’s arithmetic as follows.
(S1) x+ 1 6= 0;
(S2) x+ 1 = y + 1→ x = y;
(S3) x+ 0 = x;
(S4) x+ (y + 1) = (x+ y) + 1;
(S5) x · 0 = 0;
(S6) x · (y + 1) = (x · y) + x;
(S7) ϕ(0,
⇀
y ) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x,
⇀
y )→ ϕ(x+ 1,
⇀
y )
)
→ ∀xϕ(x,
⇀
y ), where ϕ(x,
⇀
y ) is a
formula in L.
For simplicity, we abbreviate
n 1′s︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 + . . .+ 1 as n. From the above Peano’s
axioms, we may observe that equations (S3)-(S6) alone define N under initial
algebra semantics and so we may consider (S1) and (S2) as additions, mak-
ing a first refinement of the standard algebraic specification for arithmetic,
desired to rule out finite models. The theoretical objective of adding the in-
duction axiom (S7) is self-evident: one wants to generate all assertions which
make statements about N which can be based on its simple arithmetical op-
erators and which can be proved by the principle of induction. For example,
one can obtain facts about the ordering x < y of natural numbers by using
the formula ∃z(z 6= 0 ∧ x+ z = y).
Let M = ( M , +M, ·M, <M, 0M, 1M ) be a countable model of Peano
arithmetic, i.e. M |= ϕ for each axiom ϕ of PA, where M is the universe of
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M, and I is an interpretation such that
I(+,M) = +M;
I(·,M) = ·M;
I(<,M) = <M;
I(0,M) = 0M;
I(1,M) = 1M.
If M is not isomorphic to the standard model N = (N , +N, ·N, <N, 0,
1 ), then M is nonstandard. There is a submodel NM = ( NM, +N
M
, ·N
M
,
<N
M
, 0N
M
, 1N
M
) of M such that NM is isomorphic to N, where NM =
{I(n,M) : n ∈ N} is the universe of NM and
+N
M
= +M ↾ NM;
·N
M
= ·M ↾ NM;
<N
M
= <M↾ NM;
0N
M
= 0M;
1N
M
= 1M.
We call elements in NM standard, and nonstandard otherwise. There exists
a nonstandard model of PA, which is a direct consequence of the compact-
ness theorem(see the argument of Corollary 25.3 in [12, p306]). For more
information about nonstandard models, refer to Chapter 25 in [12].
In this paper, we need to understand the order in nonstandard models
of PA. Let K be the set consisting of all natural numbers together with all
pairs (q, a) where q is a rational number and a an integer. Let <K be the
order on K in which the natural numbers come first, in their usual order, and
the pairs afterward, ordered as follows: (q, a) <K (r, b) if and only if q < r in
the usual order on rational numbers, or q = r and a < b in the usual order
on integers. Then, the argument of Theorem 25.1 in [12, p304] implies that
Lemma 2.1.1. The order relation on any enumerable nonstandard model of
PA is isomorphic to the ordering <K of K.
The semantics of the first-order logic has its standard definition in model
theory and we assume to be understood. The validity of p ∈ L over model
M we write M |= p. Let T be a theory of L. We write T |= p to mean
that for every M |= T , M |= p. From Go¨del’s Soundness and Completeness
Theorem, it deduces that T ⊢ p if and only if T |= p.
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2.2. Coding functions
A function f : Nn → N is arithmetically definable, or arithmetical for
short, if and only if there is a formula F (
⇀
x, y) in L such that for any
⇀
a∈
Nn, b ∈ N we have f(
⇀
a) = b if and only if N |= F (
⇀
a,b). Boolos, et.al[12,
p204] writes that:
Lemma 2.2.1 (Definability of Recursive Functions). Every recursive func-
tion is arithmetical.
It is a well-known fact that there exist one-to-one correspondences be-
tween the set of natural numbers and the set of ordered pairs of natural
numbers and, indeed, that such a correspondence can be set up in an effec-
tive manner [13, p43].
Lemma 2.2.2 (Pairing Function Lemma). There exist recursive functions
〈x, y〉, L(z), R(z) such that
〈L(z), R(z)〉 = z,
L(〈x, y〉) = x,
R(〈x, y〉) = y.
For notational convenience, we denote (L(z), R(z)) by z¯. The pairing
function can be extended to n-tuples by setting
〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 = 〈x1, 〈x2, . . . , xn〉〉
and
〈x1, . . . .xn〉 = (x1, 〈x2, . . . , xn〉).
To code a finite sequence (a0, . . . , ar) of natural numbers, we can use two
suitably chosen natural numbers s and t as codes, which is the following
lemma[14, p177].
Lemma 2.2.3 (β-Function Lemma). There is a recursive function β : N3 →
N satisfying for every sequence (a0, . . . , ar) over N there exist s, t ∈ N such
that for all i ≤ r, β(s, t, i) = ai.
Now, we define (x)i to be
(x)i = β(L(x), R(x), i).
Then, for any finite sequence (a0, . . . , ar) of natural numbers, we can use one
natural number c as the code such that (c)i = ai for each i ≤ r. Obviously,
(x)i is a recursive function, which is arithmetical.
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3. Hoare’s logic based on PA
The logical language L′ for Hoare’s logic with respect to Peano’s arith-
metic consists of the language L of arithmetic, in which assertions describing
a program’s behavior are specified and the expressions forming the right-hand
sides of assignment statements and quantifier-free boolean expressions of con-
ditionals and iterative statements are specified, plus program constructs:
• constant symbols: 0, 1 ;
• function symbols: +, · ;
• binary predicate symbol: < ;
• variables for numbers: x0, x1, x2, . . . ;
• logical connectives and quantifiers: ¬, →, ∀ ;
• program constructs: :=, ;, if , then, else, fi, while, do, od.
An expression e is defined as follows:
e ::= 0 | 1 | x | e1 + e2 | e1 · e2;
and a boolean expression b is defined as follows:
b ::= e1 < e2 | ¬b1 | b1 → b2.
A program S is defined as follows:
S ::= x := e | S1;S2 | if b then S1 else S2 fi | while b do S0 od.
An assertion p is defined as follows:
p ::= b | ¬p1 | p1 → p2 | ∀xp1(x).
Then, an asserted program ϕ is a Hoare’s triple of the following form:
ϕ ::= {p1}S{p2}.
In the present context, we obviously prefer the more suggestive term
specification to theory.
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Hoare’s logic with respect to the specification PA, has the following ax-
ioms and proof rules for manipulating asserted programs: Let S, S0, S1, S2 ∈
WP ; p, q, p1, q1, r ∈ L; b ∈ L, a quantifier-free formula.
(1) Assignment axiom scheme: for e an expression and x a variable of L′,
the asserted program
{p(e/x)}x := e{p}
is an axiom, where p(e/x) stands for the result of substituting e for free
occurrences of x in p.
(2) Composition rule:
{p}S1{r}, {r}S2{q}
{p}S1;S2{q}
(3) Conditional rule:
{p ∧ b}S1{q}, {p ∧ ¬b}S2{q}
{p}if b then S1 else S2 fi{q}
(4) Iteration rule:
{p ∧ b}S0{p}
{p}while b do S0 od{p ∧ ¬b}
(5) Consequence rule:
p→ p1, {p1}S{q1}, q1 → q
{p}S{q}
And, in connection with (5),
(6) Specification axiom: Each theorem of PA is an axiom.
Note that the purpose of the specification is is to generate the assertions
about the data types necessary to govern Consequence rule. The set of
asserted programs derivable from these axioms by the proof rules we denote
HL(PA) and we write HL(PA) ⊢ {p}S{q} in place of {p}S{q} ∈ HL(PA).
The semantics for Hoare’s logic is a Kripke’s possible world semantics,
where the possible worlds are stores, and S are interpreted as modalities.
Let M = (M, I) be a model of PA and W the set of all the assign-
ments(stores), functions from variables to M .
A model M′ for Hoare’s logic based on PA is the triple (W, {RS : S ∈
WP},M) where RS is a binary relation on W such that for any w,w
′ ∈ W ,
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• (w,w′) ∈ Rx:=e iff w
′ = w(eI,w/x), where eI,wis defined in the following;
• (w,w′) ∈ RS1;S2 iff (w,w
′) ∈ RS1 ◦RS2 , where (z, z
′) ∈ R1 ◦R2 iff there
is a z′′ such that (z, z′′) ∈ R1 and (z
′′, z′) ∈ R2;
• (w,w′) ∈ Rif b then S1 else S2 fi iff either M, w |= b and (w,w
′) ∈ RS1 or
M, w 6|= b and (w,w′) ∈ RS2;
• (w,w′) ∈ Rwhile b do S0 od iff there exist natural number i and w0 =
w,w1, . . . , wi = w
′ such that for each 0 ≤ j < i,M, wj |= b, (wj , wj+1) ∈
RS0 , and M, w
′ 6|= b.
Given a possible world w and an expression e, the interpretation eI,w of
e in w is defined as follows:
eI,w =


0M if e = 0
1M if e = 1
w(x) if e = x
eI,w1 +
M eI,w2 if e = e1 + e2
eI,w1 ·
M eI,w2 if e = e1 · e2.
Given a possible world w and a boolean expression b, b is satisfied in w,
denoted by M, w |= b, if


eI,w1 <
M eI,w2 if b = e1 < e2
M, w 6|= b1 if b = ¬b1
M, w |= b1 ⇒M, w |= b2, if b = b1 → b2,
where instead of using ⇒ as the logical implication in Hoare’s logic, we use
→ 1.
Given a possible world w and an assertion p, we say that p is satisfied in
w, denoted by M, w |= p, if

M, w |= b if p = b
M, w 6|= p1 if p = ¬p1
M, w |= p1 ⇒M, w |= p2, if p = p1 → p2
Aa ∈ M(M, w(a/x) |= p1(x)) if p = ∀xp1(x).
1In syntax, we use ¬,∧,→, ∀, ∃ to denote the logical connectives and quantifiers; and in
semantics we use ∼,&,⇒,A,E to denote the corresponding connectives and quantifiers.
10
Given a possible world w, an asserted program {p}S{q} is satisfied at w,
denoted by M, w |= {p}S{q}, if
M, w |= p⇒ Aw′
(
(w,w′) ∈ RS ⇒M, w
′ |= q
)
.
Then, M |= {p}S{q} iff for any possible world w, M, w |= {p}S{q}. PA |=
{p}S{q} iff for any model M of PA, M |= {p}S{q}. We also denote PA |=
{p}S{q} by HL(PA) |= {p}S{q}.
4. Proof of the Separation Theorem
4.1. Arithmetical definability of N-computable functions
Let N′ = (W, {RS : S ∈ WP},N) be the model of Hoare’s logic based
on PA, where RS is the accessibility relation for S ∈ WP over the standard
structureN, and
⇀
x the list of variables of length n occurring in while-program
S in the following. RS induces a vectorial function fS : N
n → Nn such that
for any
⇀
a,
⇀
c∈ Nn,
fS(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c
if and only if there exist w,w′ ∈ W such that w(
⇀
x) =
⇀
a , w′(
⇀
x) =
⇀
c and
(w,w′) ∈ RS. Let fS = (f
(1)
S , . . . , f
(i)
S , . . . , f
(n)
S ). Then the ith component f
(i)
S
of fS is a function from N
n to N . We call the function f
(i)
S is N-computable.
Lemma 4.1.1. fS is well-defined. That is, for any w1, w
′
1, w2, w
′
2 ∈ W with
(w1, w
′
1), (w2, w
′
2) ∈ RS, if w1(
⇀
x) = w2(
⇀
x), then w′1(
⇀
x) = w′2(
⇀
x).
Proof. By induction on the structure of S.
Next, we study how to arithmetically define fS. Construct the formula
αS inductively in L.
Assignment: S ≡ xi := e
αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ≡ yi = e(
⇀
x) ∧
∧
j 6=i
yj = xj ;
Composition: S ≡ S1;S2
αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ≡ ∃
⇀
z (αS1(
⇀
x,
⇀
z /
⇀
y ) ∧ αS2(
⇀
z /
⇀
x,
⇀
y ));
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Conditional: S ≡ if b then S1 else S2 fi
αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ≡ (b(
⇀
x) ∧ αS1(
⇀
x,
⇀
y )) ∨ (¬b(
⇀
x) ∧ αS2(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ));
Iteration: S ≡ while b do S0 od. First, define
AS(i, w,
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ≡
⇀
x= (w)0 ∧ ∀j < i(b((w)j/
⇀
x)
∧ αS0((w)j/
⇀
x, (w)j+1/
⇀
y ))∧
⇀
y= (w)i
then, set
α∗S(i,
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ≡ ∃wAS(i, w,
⇀
x,
⇀
y )
and so define
αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ≡ ∃iα∗S(i,
⇀
x,
⇀
y ) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
y /
⇀
x).
Lemma 4.1.2. fS is arithmetically definable by αS.
Proof. It is equivalent to prove that for any
⇀
a,
⇀
c∈ Nn, fS(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c ⇔ αS(
⇀
a,
⇀
c)
is correct.
The argument is an induction on S for which the basis is the assignment
statement.
Assignment:S ≡ xi := e. fS(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c ⇔ (v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x)) ∈ RS ⇔
ci = e
I,v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x ) and cj = aj for j 6= i ⇔ ci = e(a) ∧
∧
j 6=i cj = aj is correct ⇔
αS(
⇀
a,
⇀
c) is correct.
Composition:S ≡ S1;S2. fS(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c ⇔ (v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x)) ∈ RS ⇔
(⇒.There exists a vector
⇀
d of natural numbers such that)(v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
d /
⇀
x
)) ∈ RS1 and (v(
⇀
d /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x)) ∈ RS2 ⇔ fS1(
⇀
a) =
⇀
d and fS2(
⇀
d) =
⇀
c ⇔
(⇐.There exists a vector
⇀
d of natural numbers such that)αS1(
⇀
a,
⇀
d) is correct
and αS2(
⇀
d,
⇀
c) is correct ⇔ ∃
⇀
z (αS1(
⇀
a ,
⇀
z /
⇀
y )∧ αS2(
⇀
z /
⇀
x,
⇀
c)) is correct ⇔
αS(
⇀
a,
⇀
c) is correct.
Conditional:S ≡ if b then S1 else S2 fi. fS(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c ⇔ (v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x
)) ∈ RS ⇔ N, v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x) |= b and (v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x)) ∈ RS1 or N, v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x
) 6|= b and (v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x)) ∈ RS2 ⇔ N |= b(
⇀
a) and fS1(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c or N |=
¬b(
⇀
a) and fS2(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c ⇔ b(
⇀
a) is correct and αS1(
⇀
a,
⇀
c) is correct or ¬b(
⇀
a) is
correct and αS2(
⇀
a ,
⇀
c) is correct ⇔
(
b(
⇀
a)∧ αS1(
⇀
a,
⇀
c)
)
∨
(
¬b(
⇀
a)∧ αS2(
⇀
a ,
⇀
c)
)
is correct ⇔ αS(
⇀
a ,
⇀
c) is correct.
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Iteration:S ≡ while b do S0 od. fS(
⇀
a) =
⇀
c ⇔ (v(
⇀
a /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x)) ∈ RS
⇔ there exist natural number i and vectors of natural numbers
⇀
a0,. . .,
⇀
ai such
that
⇀
a=
⇀
a0, for any j less than i, N, v(
⇀
aj /
⇀
x) |= b and (v(
⇀
aj /
⇀
x), v(
⇀
aj+1
/
⇀
x)) ∈ RS0 ,
⇀
c=
⇀
ai, N, v(
⇀
c /
⇀
x) 6|= b ⇔ there exist natural number i and
vectors of natural numbers
⇀
a0,. . .,
⇀
ai such that
⇀
a=
⇀
a0, for any j less than i,
N |= b(
⇀
aj) and fS0(
⇀
aj) =
⇀
aj+1,
⇀
c=
⇀
ai, N |= ¬b(
⇀
c ) ⇔ there exist natural
number i and vectors of natural numbers
⇀
a0,. . .,
⇀
ai such that
⇀
a=
⇀
a0, for any j
less than i, b(
⇀
aj) is correct and αS0(
⇀
aj,
⇀
aj+1) is correct,
⇀
c=
⇀
ai, ¬b(
⇀
c) is correct
⇔ there exist natural number i and vectors of natural numbers
⇀
a0,. . .,
⇀
ai such
that
⇀
a=
⇀
a0 ∧∀j < i
(
b(
⇀
aj) ∧ αS0
( ⇀
aj,
⇀
aj+1
))
∧
⇀
c=
⇀
ai ∧¬b(
⇀
c ) is correct ⇔
there exist natural numbers i, d0,. . .,di such that
⇀
a= d0 ∧ ∀j < i
(
b(dj) ∧
αS0
(
dj,dj+1
))
∧
⇀
c= di ∧ ¬b(
⇀
c ) is correct ⇔ there exist natural numbers
i and w such that
⇀
a= (w)0 ∧ ∀j < i
(
b((w)j) ∧ αS0
(
(w)j, (w)j+1
))
∧
⇀
c=
(w)i ∧ ¬b(
⇀
c ) is correct ⇔ there exist natural numbers i and w such that
AS(i,w,
⇀
a,
⇀
c) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
c ) is correct ⇔ ∃i∃wB(i, w,
⇀
a ,
⇀
c) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
c) is correct ⇔
αS(
⇀
a,
⇀
c) is correct.
Define α
(i)
S (
⇀
x, y) as follows:
α
(i)
S (
⇀
x, y) ::= ∃y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , ynαS(
⇀
x,
(y1, . . . , yi−1, y, yi+1, . . . , yn)).
Then, we can easily achieve that f
(i)
S is arithmetically defined by α
(i)
S from
the above lemma. Actually, these two definabilities are interconvertible.
4.2. The definition of SP (p, S)
Now, we define strongest postconditions. Given the modelN′ = (W, {RS :
S ∈ WP},N) of Hoare’s logic based on PA, p ∈ L and S ∈ WP , then the
strongest postcondition spN(p, S) of p and S relative toN is the set of possible
worlds:
{w ∈ W : Ew′ ∈ W (N, w′ |= p & (w′, w) ∈ RS)}.
From the definitions, it immediately follows that
Lemma 4.2.1. N |= {p}S{q} ⇔ spN(p, S) ⊂ {w ∈ W : N, w |= q}.
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Like the definition of SP (p, S) in [11, p271], we can inductively define
SP (p, S) over the structure of S as follows:
Assignment: S ≡ xi := e
SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) ≡ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ xi = e(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧
∧
j 6=i
xj = uj
)
;
Composition: S ≡ S1;S2
SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) ≡ SP
(
SP (p, S1), S2
)
(
⇀
x);
Conditional: S ≡ if b then S1 else S2 fi
SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) ≡ SP (p ∧ b, S1)(
⇀
x) ∨ SP (p ∧ ¬b, S2)(
⇀
x);
Iteration: S ≡ while b do S0 od
SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) ≡ INV (p, b, S0)(
⇀
x) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
x),
where INV (p, b, S0) is the loop invariant formula(refer to Invariant Law in
[11, p277]) built up as follows.
First, define
B(p, b, S0)(i, w,
⇀
x) ≡ p((w)0/
⇀
x) ∧ ∀j < i SP
( ⇀
x= (w)j
∧ b, S0
)(
(w)j+1/
⇀
x
)
∧
⇀
x= (w)i.
Next set
INV ∗(p, b, S0)(i,
⇀
x) ≡ ∃wB(p, b, S0)(i, w,
⇀
x)
and so define
INV (p, b, S0)(
⇀
x) ≡ ∃iINV ∗(p, b, S0)(i,
⇀
x).
The definition of SP (p, S) in [11, p271] entails:
Lemma 4.2.2. SP (p, S) arithmetically defines spN(p, S).
From the preceding two lemmas, it deduces that
Lemma 4.2.3. N |= {p}S{q} ⇔ N |= SP (p, S)→ q.
Lemma 4.2.3 is a special case of statement (3) in Theorem 1.1, when
restricting the model of PA to N.
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4.3. Proof of the Separation Theorem: The equivalent form of SP (p, S) in
PA
Until now, we have finished all the preparations for the Separation Theo-
rem. Let’s turn to the last part of the proof of the theorem. In the sequel, we
argue that SP (p, S) has an equivalent form ∃
⇀
u (p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x)∧αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y ))
in PA.
Theorem 4.3.1. PA ⊢ SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u (p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )).
Proof. By Go¨del’s Soundness and Completeness Theorem,
PA ⊢ SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
if and only if
PA |= SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Consequently, it suffices to prove for any M |= PA,
M |= SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Fix M |= PA. The argument is by induction on the structure of S for which
the basis is the assignment.
Assignment:S ≡ xi := e. According to the definition, SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) is
equivalent in M to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ xi = e(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧
∧
j 6=i
xj = uj
)
,
by pure logic and the definition of αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ), it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Thus,
M |= SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Composition: S ≡ S1;S2. The induction hypothesis applied to S1 and S2
yields
M |= SP (p, S1)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
,
M |= SP (SP (p, S1), S2)(
⇀
x)
↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
SP (p, S1)(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS2(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
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Consider this last formula through several transformations: replacing
⇀
u by
⇀
z , it is equivalent in M to
∃
⇀
z
(
SP (p, S1)(
⇀
z /
⇀
x) ∧ αS2(
⇀
z /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
With the substitution of ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x)∧αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
z /
⇀
y )
)
for SP (p, S1)(
⇀
z
/
⇀
x), it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
z
(
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
z /
⇀
y )
)
∧ αS2(
⇀
z /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
By pure logic, it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ ∃
⇀
z
(
αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
z /
⇀
y ) ∧ αS2(
⇀
z /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
))
.
By the definition of αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ), it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Thus, by the definition, SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) is equivalent in M to
SP (SP (p, S1), S2)(
⇀
x),
By the above argument, it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Therefore,
M |= SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Conditional: S ≡ if b then S1 else S2 fi. By the induction hypothesis
applied to S1, S2, it yields
M |= SP (p ∧ b, S1)(
⇀
x)
↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
,
M |= SP (p ∧ ¬b, S2)(
⇀
x)
↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS2(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
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According to the definition, SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) is equivalent in M to
SP (p ∧ b, S1)(
⇀
x) ∨ SP (p ∧ ¬b, S2)(
⇀
x)
Consider this last formula through several transformations: by substitutions,
it is equivalent in M to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
∨ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS2(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
By pure logic, it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧
((
b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS1(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
∨
(
¬b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS2(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)))
.
By the definition of αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ), it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
So, we obtain
M |= SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Iteration: S ≡ while b do S0 od. Applying the induction hypothesis to
S0 yields
M |= SP
( ⇀
x= (w)j ∧ b, S0
)
(
⇀
x)
↔ ∃
⇀
u
( ⇀
u= (w)j ∧ b(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS0(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
By the generalized coding function assumed by Bergstra, et.al[11], the last
formula in the above theorem is equivalent in M to
b
(
(w)j/
⇀
x
)
∧ αS0
(
(w)j/
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y
)
.
Then,
M |= SP
( ⇀
x= (w)j ∧ b, S0
)
(
⇀
x)
↔ b
(
(w)j/
⇀
x
)
∧ αS0
(
(w)j/
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y
)
.
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Substituting (w)j+1 for each free occurrence of
⇀
x in the above formula gives
M |= SP
( ⇀
x= (w)j ∧ b, S0
)(
(w)j+1/
⇀
x
)
↔ b
(
(w)j/
⇀
x
)
∧ αS0
(
(w)j/
⇀
x, (w)j+1/
⇀
y
)
.
From the definition, it follows directly that B(p, b, S0)(i, w,
⇀
x) is equivalent
in M to
p((w)0/
⇀
x) ∧ ∀j < iSP
( ⇀
x= (w)j ∧ b, S0
)(
(w)j+1/
⇀
x
)
∧
⇀
x= (w)i.
By the above formula, it is equivalent to
p((w)0/
⇀
x) ∧ ∀j < i
(
b
(
(w)j/
⇀
x
)
∧ αS0
(
(w)j/
⇀
x, (w)j+1/
⇀
y
))
∧
⇀
x= (w)i.
According to the definition of AS(i, w,
⇀
x,
⇀
y ), it is equivalent to
p((w)0/
⇀
x) ∧ AS(i, w, (w)0/
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y ).
With the generalized coding function, it is equivalent in M to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ AS(i, w,
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Therefore,
M |= B(p, b, S0)(i, w,
⇀
x)
↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ AS(i, w,
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
By the definition, SP (p, S)(
⇀
x) is equivalent in M to
INV (p, b, S0)(
⇀
x) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
x).
Now, consider the last formula through several transformations: it is equiv-
alent in M to
∃i∃wB(p, b, S0)(i, w,
⇀
x) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
x).
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By the above formula, it is equivalent to
∃i∃w∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧AS(i, w,
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
∧ ¬b(
⇀
x).
By pure logic, it is equivalent to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ ∃i∃wAS(i, w,
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y ) ∧ ¬b(
⇀
x)
)
.
And, clearly, by the definition of αS(
⇀
x,
⇀
y ), this last formula is equivalent in
M to
∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
Thus,
M |= SP (p, S)(
⇀
x)↔ ∃
⇀
u
(
p(
⇀
u /
⇀
x) ∧ αS(
⇀
u /
⇀
x,
⇀
x /
⇀
y )
)
.
And we are done.
5. Discussion and Future Work
The corollary 1.3 looks on αS as the logical characterization of while-
program S in PA. In the sequel, we shall extend the computability induced
by S from the standard structure to any nonstandard model of PA through
αS. Lemma 4.1.2 presents that αS arithmetically defines f
N
S , i.e. for any
vectors of natural numbers
⇀
a ,
⇀
c , fNS (
⇀
a) =
⇀
c iff N |= αS(
⇀
a,
⇀
c ). Then for
any nonstandard model M = (M, I) of PA, we define fMS such that for any
elements
⇀
a,
⇀
c∈ Mn, fMS (
⇀
a) =
⇀
c iff M |= αS(
⇀
a,
⇀
c ). Thus, fMS is an extension
of fNS with the uniform Σ1-definability in L. It remains to verify the validity
of this underlying semantics(type-1 semantics).
Consider the while-program S as follows:
y := 0;while y < x do y := y + 1 od,
where the program variable x is the only input and output variable. Then,
by the generalized coding function, fNS = id
N and αS(x, y) is logically equiv-
alent to y = x. By idN we mean the identity function defined in N , i.e.
dom(idN) = N . Let M = (M, I) be any nonstandard model of PA. Then,
M-computable function fMS defined in M by αS, in which the generalized
coding function codes the M-finite sequence of pairs (0, x), (1, x) . . . (x, x), is
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idM(dom(idM) = M). Therefore, the type-1 semantics extends the number
of halting steps from N-finiteness to M-finiteness, which makes L expressive
relative to M.
On the other hand, up to now, we have known that the number of iterative
steps of a loop is defined in the standard part of M, as treated in this paper.
In this semantics(type-2 semantics), the M-computable function induced by
S on M is defined in NM, i.e. idN
M
. By the Overspill principle[12, p309],
NM is not arithmetically defined in M. Hence, idN
M
is not arithmetically
defined in M.
To make the type-2 semantics defined logically, introduce a new predicate
symbol to the language of arithmetic, which defines NM in M, and restrict
its occurrences in formulas, say in a guarded fashion. The paper [15] is an
attempt for the type-2 semantics.
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